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5 Pointz Down: The New York District Court Ruling on 
‘Graffiti Mecca’. 
 
Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 
Introduction: 
 
The perception of Graffiti both in the aesthetic and wider cultural sense has modified considerably 
over recent times. In an era when Banksy is the doyen of much of the popular media and critical 
circles, it is perhaps timely that the legal system reflects on this evolving artform and questions 
traditional assumptions on which the interpretation of the law is premised.  
 
The 5 Pointz building in Long Island City, Queens, New York has come to be known as many things 
in recent years including ‘Graffiti Mecca’, ‘The United Nations of Graffiti’ and ‘The Institute of 
Higher Burnin’. By 2013, the two hundred thousand square foot former factory had become the 
foremost global setting for the public exhibition of graffiti and a major New York tourist attraction. 
From the early to mid-1990’s onwards the 5 Pointz, then known as the ‘Phun Phactory’, had become 
the site for a disorganised array of what the court deemed ‘distasteful graffiti’1 by aerosol artists. In an 
attempt to control this situation, Jonathan Cohen, a graffiti artist known in the art world as ‘Meres 
One’, approached the property’s owner, Jerry Wolkoff, with a proposition that he would curate the 
works at 5 Pointz. This proposition was accepted by Wolkoff, who stated that he ‘was supportive of 
creative efforts but wanted somebody to manage it.’2 This was not a written agreement but rather a 
‘general agreement that [Cohen] would be allowed to select who would be permitted to paint on the 
walls.’3 
 
In 2013, on receipt of the news that the building was due for demolition and redevelopment, the artists 
concerned sought an injunction in the District Court under the moral rights provisions of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act 1990 (VARA)4 which offers protection to authors of  visual works of art in relation 
to the ‘intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification 
of that work is a violation of that right’5 and which also seeks ‘to prevent any destruction of a work of 
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of 
that right.’6 Both of these sections are subject to limitations as set out in 17 USC § 113(d)7. It was 
under the latter provision that this action proceeded. 
 
                                                      
1 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 10 
2 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 10 
3 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 10 
4 17USC §106A 
5 17USC §106A(a)(3)(A) 
6 17USC §106A(a)(3)(B) 
7 These include, inter alia, provisions requiring the owner to give the requisite notice to the artist if that owner is 
proceeding with the destruction of the property. 
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Judge Frederic Block expressly acknowledged, this case is the first in which a court in the US has had 
to adjudicate on whether works of exterior graffiti art, given their inherent transient nature, are worthy 
of legal protection. 
Graffiti and the Law. 
 
Traditional assumptions about graffiti are generally premised on the presumption that such works are 
illegal, accordingly the Oxford English Dictionary definition is thus, ‘Writing or drawings scribbled, 
scratched, or sprayed illicitly on a wall or other surface in a public place’.8 But as an art form graffiti 
has evolved from an indicator of urban decline to become a widely accepted and acknowledge form of 
artistic self-expression.9 The vocabulary in the discourse around such art has migrated from that 
related to gang’s territorial marking and acts of vandalism to that of the masterpiece, the recent sale of 
Banksy’s work ‘Kissing Coppers’ for over half a million dollars again confirming this new found 
status.10 It is also now the case that much contemporary graffiti, as in the case at hand, is painted 
legally. 
 
Legal graffiti has been held copyrightable in the US11 once it satisfies the criteria of being an original 
work of authorship that is fixed in ‘a tangible medium of expression.’12 Copyright Law has often been 
professed to remain content neutral at least in terms of express restrictions but it is arguable that the 
strength of this assertion has varied at any given time.  The New York District Court has previously 
held that works are not eligible for copyright protection if a work is not original or ‘free from 
illegality to immorality’13 but more recent decisions have held illegal works may be eligible for 
protection.14 The current position could safely be described as uncertain. It is a fact however that ‘the 
assertion that illegal graffiti is barred from copyright protection is an untested one, as no court has 
held directly on the legality requirement vis-a-vis graffiti art.’15 In the instant case however there was 
general agreement that the graffiti in question was created with permission. 
 
VARA’s moral rights provisions have been held to apply only to legal graffiti.16 Under VARA a work 
of visual art is defined as ‘a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies’ but as not including ‘any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, 
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work…’.17 As stated, for the 
                                                      
8 Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
9 http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/consider-this/Consider-This-blog/2013/10/15/how-has-
graffitievolved.html accessed on 08/03/2014 
10 http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/banksys-kissing-coppers-sells-for-575000-at-
miami-street-art-auction-9138032.html accessed on 08/03/2014 
11 Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc v ABC Commc’ns, Inc, 264 F.3d 622 (6th Cir 2001); Mager v Brand New Sch, 78 
USPQ 2d 1389 (SDNY 2004) 
12 17 USC §102(a) 
13 Hoffman v Le Traunik, 209 F 375, 379 (NDNY 1913)  ; Bullard v Esper, 72 F Supp548 (ND Tex 1947) 
14 See eg:  Mitchell Bros Film Grp v Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F 2d 852 (5th Cir 1979) ; FlavaWorks, Inc v 
Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir 2012) 
15 Al Roundtree, Graffiti Artists ‘Get Up’ in Intellectual Property's Negative Space (2012-2013) 31 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent LJ 959, 969  
16 English v BFC & R E 11th St LLC, 1997 WL 746444 (SDNY). This case related to a community garden 
developed without permission. The judgment relied on the decision of a Californian court, Botello v Shell Oil 
Co, 280 Cal Rptr 535 (Ct App 1991) where it was held that state moral rights provision applied only to legally 
created artworks, the court stating, ‘It obviously does not apply to graffiti, which…is hardly classifiable as “fine 
art”, (and) which is the subject of several criminal laws.’ 
17 17 USC §101 
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purposes of moral rights relating to destruction, the work must be of a ‘recognized stature’, it is this 
aspect of the statute that occupied the court most during the hearing for injunctive relief. 
The Decision: 
 
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction under the provisions a 17 USC §106 A(a)(3)(b) of 
VARA, the moral rights provisions protecting the integrity of an artwork, which allow for protection 
against the destruction of the work in certain circumstances. The plaintiff’s further sought to argue 
that their prospective contractual relations had been tortuously interfered with by the defendants and 
also that Jonathan Cohen has an easement in gross to use the buildings but these latter arguments were 
dismissed as meritless. On November 12, 2013, the application for injunction was refused and a 
written opinion on the matter was delivered on November 20, 2013. On the November 19, 2013, the 
plaintiffs’ counsel filed a letter with the court to confirm that ‘under the cover of darkness’ the 
previous night all the visual art at 5 Pointz had been whitewashed over by the defendants.18 The 
primary issues that the District Court focused on were those of whether the works in question were of 
the necessary ‘recognised stature’ to engage the relevant VARA moral rights provisions and secondly, 
whether the inherent transient nature of the graffiti at hand would mitigate against the granting of 
injunctive relief. 
 
 
Recognised Stature: 
 
The plaintiffs adduced 24 photographs of works that had been present on the walls of 5 Pointz which 
they argued were of the requisite ‘recognised stature’.  VARA does not define ‘recognised stature’ 
and the District court sought to delineate the boundaries of the term by first referencing both the 
District19 and Second Circuit decisions in Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc.20  Interestingly, rather than 
view the aforementioned VARA protection against the destruction of works of ‘recognised stature’ as 
a subset of the integrity right, the Second Circuit saw this protection as conceptually a separate right 
from the general integrity right. 21 The district court decision in Carter provided a two tier test for the 
determination of the stature of a work. Firstly, ‘(1) that the visual art in question has ‘stature’ i.e. is 
viewed meritorious, and (2) that this stature is ‘recognised’ by art experts, other members of the 
artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.’22 Carter aside, Judge Block found only three 
other cases that had broached the substantive issue of what constituted ‘recognised stature’, one 
circuit court and two from the district court. 
 
The Seventh Circuit in Martin v City of Indianapolis23commented that ‘the Carter v Helmsley Spear 
test may be more rigorous that Congress intended.’ In Pollara v Seymour24 the district court that a 
                                                      
18 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 2 
19 Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc, 71 F 3d 77 
20 Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc, 861 F Supp 303 (SDNY 1994) 
21 Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc, 71 F 3d 77, 83 
22 Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc, 861 F Supp 303, 325 (SDNY 1994). The District court also interestingly note at 
this point that an earlier draft of VARA contained provisions that allowed a court to ‘take into account the 
opinion of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, and other persons involved with the creation, appreciation, 
history, or marketing of works of recognised sources.’ It also stated that a court could ‘can, and should, consider 
these sources.’ 
23 Martin v City of Indianapolis, 192 F 3d 608, 612 (7th Cir 1999) 
24 Pollara v Seymour, 206 F Supp 2d 333 (NDNY 2002) 
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work was not of recognised stature because while it was ‘unquestionably meritorious’ it was ‘intended 
solely as a display piece for a one-time event.’25 The court further stated that ‘it defies the underlying 
purpose of VARA to assume that the statute was intended to protect works of artistic merit without 
regard to whether such works were ever intended to be preserved for posterity as works of artistic 
merit.’26 Lastly, in Scott v Dixon a statue housed in a secluded back garden was not deemed to attract 
protection as ‘while the Sculpture may have artistic merit, it was not a work of recognised stature 
within the meaning of VARA’, this as a result of the fact that it had not been exposed to the public.27  
 
Much of the testimony in relation to the 24 selected 5 Pointz works did not differentiate between the 
two ‘discreet words’ but did on the whole equate artistic merit with ‘recognised stature.’28One of the 
plaintiffs, Danielle Mastrion, stated that her work ‘Kool Herc’ (one of the 24 works presented by the 
plaintiffs) was of recognised stature as it satisfied criteria such as ‘technical ability, composition, 
color, line work, detail and also the artist’s credentials’.29 However the testimony of art experts from 
both sides in the case did focus on the issue of public recognition the works.  
 
Professor Erin Thompson for the defence stated that while quality is undoubtedly a factor in stature, 
that more correctly ‘stature is recognizing not particular qualities of objects, but the way these objects 
are valued by the public.’30 She further stated that while innovation and uniqueness in a work should 
be of a threshold where scholars agree that the work is ‘changing the history of art’, she testified that 
none of the works in question met this standard.31 The fact that 5 Pointz had achieved a wide 
recognition as a tourist attraction did not in in itself satisfy VARA according to Thompson, unless 
visitor’s came to see ‘a particular work of art’32 She did however cite Banksy as proof that aerosol art 
could attain the standard of ‘recognised stature’, citing, inter alia, the myriad dissertations and 
scholarly articles referencing his work as evidence of this.33 Lastly, Thompson did acknowledge that 
‘something can be ephemeral and achieve recognised stature.’34  
 
For the plaintiffs , Daniel Simmons, head of the Rush Philanthropic arts Foundation and owner of two 
New York art galleries, testified that all 24 works in question qualified as ‘real artworks’.35 He 
focused on the inherent qualities of the art, its ‘design, color, shape, form’ and characteristics of 
‘symmetry’ and ‘innovation’.36 Of Danielle Mastrion’s ‘Kool Herc’, he stated that ‘there’s enough 
people that know what [the work] looks like, and feels like and what it’s trying to impart; that it 
would be, to me, if it was missing from the canon of art history, that it would be a loss.’37 In terms of 
exposure to the public, Simmons characterised the building in question as ‘the ‘5Pointz Museum of 
Street Art’ and consequently argued that such  a justifiable characterisation and the number of visitors 
coming to the site makes any work on the building of recognised stature. He cited Meres One’s 
‘Drunken Bulbs’ as an example of a 5 Pointz work that is iconic and also that people do come 
                                                      
25 Pollara v Seymour, 206 F Supp 2d 333, 336 (NDNY 2002) 
26 Pollara v Seymour, 206 F Supp 2d 333, 336 (NDNY 2002) 
27 Scott v Dixon, 309 F Sup. 2d 395, 406 (EDNY 2004) 
28 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 13 
29 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 13 
30 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 14 
31 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 14 
32 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 15 
33 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 16 
34 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 16 
35 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 16 
36 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 16 
37 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 17 
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specifically to see this piece on the basis of this and the artists reputation.38 Simmons likened this 
work (and another by Lady Pink) to a Picasso that had just been ‘brought up from the basement’ 
making the work ‘instantly famous because of the stature of the artist.’ 39 In summation he stated that 
if the artworks in question were lost that: 
 
‘I think New York City as a whole would be diminished. It’s a major tourist 
attraction for long Island City. It is part of the development of Long Island 
City. Just like, pretty much … MoMa being there, it’s a drawing point for 
artists and art lovers to come from all over the world to see.’40 
 
 
 
Works Duration: 
 
The court heard that Jerry Wolkoff had been emphatic, when he and Cohen made their 2002 
agreement, stating that he was ultimately ‘going to be knocking the building down’ and the 
arrangement ‘was always temporary’.41 Cohen on the other hand testified there had been no discussion 
of life span but acknowledged that he did have fear for the longevity of the arrangement.42 Cohen 
stated that there was a hierarchy of works at 5Pointz, on certain walls the art was temporary and 
quickly rotating and could last from a day to a week, other works however were deemed to be 
‘permanent’, meaning they would last as long as he and the current set up was there, the artist being 
the only one with the authority to remove it.43 At the time the injunction was sought 5 Pointz housed 
about 350 images, 100 of them Cohen’s. Evidence was also produced of a 2011 video interview with 
Cohen where he acknowledged the transient nature of the works in question.44 It was also noted by the 
court that Mastrion’s ‘Kool Herc’ was painted in July 2013 and that the artist was aware both of the 
general fact that the building could come down and at any time, and more specifically was aware that 
the owners were actively seeking approval for demolition approval at the time she created the work.45 
 
 
Refusal of Injunctive Relief: 
 
Judge Block cited Picasso’s statement that ‘the purpose of art is washing the dust of daily life off our 
souls’ and speculated that such an artist would have wishes VARA protection for contemporary 
aerosol art.46 But he continued that VARA only protects works of art and does not grant the authority 
to preserve tourist sites.47 He did however acknowledge that at least some of the works in question 
presented ‘sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation’ 
but held that  the trial rather than the preliminary injunction stage was more a more appropriate setting 
for determining the issue of whether the works were of recognised stature.48 
                                                      
38 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 18 
39 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 18 
40 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 19-20 
41 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 19 
42 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 19 
43 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 20 
44 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 21 
45 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 22 
46 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 23 
47 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 23 
48 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 24 
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In determining whether the plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm and were therefore entitled to an 
injunction the court stated that: 
 
 ‘[a]lthough the works have now been destroyed – and the Court wished it 
had the power to preserve them –the plaintiffs would be hard pressed to 
contend that no amount of money would compensate them for their 
paintings; and VARA –which makes no distinction between temporary and 
permanent works of visual art- provides significant monetary damages may 
be awarded for their wrongful destruction.’49  
 
The court emphasised the difference between the 5 Pointz art works and more traditional ones that are 
more readily marketable, but did stress the fact that the plaintiffs’ works can live on through other 
media through which they may enjoy copyright protection.50 
 
In the context of examining the issues of irreparable harm and the balance of hardships, the 
determinate factor in the court’s failure to grant an injunction was ‘the transient nature of the 
plaintiffs’ work.’51 The court stated that Cohen always knew the building would be coming down also 
placed importance on the fact that many painting were recently created while the plaintiffs knew that 
the City Planning Commission had approved the defendant’s redevelopments plans. In this sense the 
court stated, ‘In a very real sense, (the) plaintiffs’ have created their own hardships.’52    
 
The court stated that the defendants do bear some of the responsibility given the fact that gave the 
project their blessing but did not seek VARA waivers.53 It was also noted that the defendants stood to 
benefit economically from the attention that the site had attracted in terms of marketing his new 
premises.54 Judge Block reiterated that VARA protects temporary works from destruction and as a 
result the ‘defendants are exposed to potentially significant monetary damages if it is ultimately 
determined after trial that the plaintiffs’ works were of ‘recognised stature.’55 
 
In terms of the public interest, the court stated that the City Planning Commission was requiring that 
3,300 square feet of the new development on the site was to be made available for art.56 It was stated 
that should more space be given toward this end and if Cohen was allowed to continue in his curatorial 
role that the court may find such gestures persuasive when and if the issue of financial damages is to 
be addressed and that such moves may lead to a reincarnation for 5 Pointz.57 Injunctive relief in this 
case was not given on the basis of the transient nature of the works but yet  VARA does give 
protection to temporary works, as a result damages may be accruing to plaintiffs. It remains to be seen 
if the case proceeds on that basis.  
 
                                                      
49 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 25 
50 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 25-26 
51 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 26 
52 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 26 
53 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 26 
54 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 26 
55 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 26-27 
56 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 27 
57 Jonathan Cohen et al v G&M Realty LP et al, Case No 13-CV-5612 (FB) (JMA) (EDNY 2013) 27 
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Conclusions: 
 
It is true that one could argue that this judgment does not address perhaps some of the wider and more 
interesting questions that suggest themselves in the area of graffiti and intellectual property law. For 
example, the aforementioned issues related to illegality and also the interaction between the 
originality requirement and graffiti were not dealt with. On the latter point, would simpler works 
containing painted single words be deemed in many cases to fulfil the ‘modicum of creativity’58 that is 
now the US threshold for originality? It must also be borne in mind that typefaces are not protectable 
per se under US copyright law.59 That having been said, the case does raise a number of pertinent 
issues concerning the evolving phenomenon of graffiti and how the law struggles to accommodate it. 
The case is all the more valuable in this regard given the paucity of judgments in this area, this due 
perhaps to the fact that the underlying nature and purpose of much graffiti is constructed around a 
‘core value of rebellion.’60 Such artists seeing themselves as beyond mainstream culture and 
particularly the legal system, hence the thought of seeking legal remedy is culturally alien. 
 
In terms of the issues this case does confront, perhaps the most central is the criteria (or arguably lack 
thereof) for determining what is ‘recognised stature’ and the inherent broad subjective nature of the 
designation of same. VARA draws a distinction between mutilation and destruction of a work in an 
attempt to balance competing property rights and those moral interests of the artist.  In the context of 
mutilation, an artist must demonstrate damage to honour or reputation but with destruction the work 
must be of ‘recognised stature’.61 There is consistent tension in jurisprudence between merit free 
assessments in identifying projectable subject matter and the inherent and often unavoidable need to 
resort to exactly such criteria to solve ontological aesthetic quandaries and resultant legal taxonomic 
quandaries.62 It may nonetheless be the case that some legislative guidance on the factors that are 
determinative for what constitutes recognised stature would indeed be warranted.63 The use of 
language such as ‘preserved for posterity’, as per the Pollara64 judgment is unhelpful in the extreme 
when dealing with many contemporary forms of artistic expression in this context.  
 
On the issue of the section 113(d) provisions, which require notification to be furnished to the artist in 
a situation of impending destruction, it is arguable that these measures do not go far enough.65 This 
section refers to 90 days’ notice that needs to be given to the artist pre-destruction of the work but this 
                                                      
58 Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340 (1991) 
59 Eltra Corp v Ringer, 579 F 2d 294 (4th Cir 1978). While typefaces are not in themselves subject of copyright 
protection, instructions as to their form contained in a computer program were held to be copyrightable in Adobe 
Sys Inc v Southern Software Inc, 45 USPQ 2d 1827 (ND Cal 1998), thereby gaining them effective indirect 
protection against verbatim copying at least. This explains the bizarre wording of Copyright Office Regulation 
202.1 (e) which states that ‘typeface as typeface’ is not protectable.  
60 Al Roundtree, Graffiti Artists ‘Get Up’ in Intellectual Property's Negative Space (2012-2013) 31 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent LJ 959, 966 
61 The latter provision is also broader in the sense that it allows for recovery for grossly negligent as well as 
intentional acts. 
62 For an example of this under UK law see Metix v Maughan [1997] FSR 718, 719.  Here in an attempt to 
clarify the definition of sculpture Laddie J held that an artist is one who considers themselves and is considered 
by others as such. Thereby arguably opening up the subjective options of ‘others’ to indirectly inform the 
definition of sculpture. 
63 David Yates and  Courtney Fiddian, ‘Now you see me: protecting visual art’ (2014)  27(1) Australian 
Intellectual Property law Bulletin 9, 12 
64 Pollara v Seymour, 206 F Supp 2d 333, 336 (NDNY 2002) 
65 William Brutocao and Eric Bjorgum, ‘VARA and CAPA: Lessons from the Twitchell Case’ (Intellectual 
Property Today September 2008)  < http://www.iptoday.com/articles/2008-9-brutocao.asp> accessed 
13/03/2014 
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apparently only applies if the owner of the building had intended the artwork be removed or 
destroyed. This wording thereby potentially leaves a gap in protection for artists in relation to 
situations where a contractor acts on their own volition unknown to the owner.66 In this case it is 
factually unclear as to the circumstances but nevertheless it would seem reasonable to aver that this 
loop hole needs to be addressed in order to achieve a better balance of owners and artist’s rights and 
also to allow prospective plaintiff’s to apply for injunctive relief where this semantic lacuna may 
ultimately prevent them doing.67  
 
As noted above, VARA does indeed protect transient works but the questions remain as to the degree 
of transience permissible under the Act. The spectrum of case law in relation to fixation leaves a 
distinct lack of clarity. The Seventh 7th Circuit in Kelley v Chicago Park District68 held that an artist’s 
wildflower garden was ‘inherently changeable, not fixed’ while in the regularly cited, and indeed 
criticised, decision of MAI Systems Corp v Peak Computers, even random access memory (RAM) 
copies of a work have been held to satisfy the fixation requirement by the Ninth Circuit.69 There has 
previously been a view expressed that ‘the proliferation of computer games may cause other courts to 
liberalize the fixation requirement’,70 but whether this will ultimately inform judgments concerning 
fixation decision in the artistic arena remains to be seen but it is without doubt that more clarification 
in this area is currently warranted.  
 
The developing position of legal graffiti is undoubtedly highlighted by this case. When thinking of 
museums and galleries in the context of more traditional art, sites such as 5Pointz and the 
phenomenon known as free walls (areas provided for by city authorities or other property owners as a 
designated area for legal graffiti where the property owner retains some control over content) have 
come to act as a highly contextualised equivalent exhibitory forum for graffiti.71  The level of 
transience in works may fluctuate on a case by case basis, but examples such as the 5 Pointz which 
contain the added aspect of curatorship, do indicate that fixation may not be always necessarily at 
issue or at least to the extent previously thought.  
 
The ‘recognised stature’ requirement indicates both a realignment (when compared with the honor 
and reputation threshold required in relation to mutilation) of the weighting of respective rights 
between the artist and the building owner but also is indicative of a ‘preservative’ cultural function in 
term of public policy.72 The District Court makes further reference to the concerns of Congress in 
terms of ‘significant societal loss’ if such works are destroyed.73 At this point one may ask whether it 
is appropriate that it is left to the artist to protect such a cultural societal resource through their moral 
rights? But further discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this comment. The loss of 5Pointz 
may be characterised as such a loss despite the references in submissions and Judges Block’s 
summation to it as a mere ‘tourist site’, a phrase which arguable belittles the cultural significance of 
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the location. Yet in fairness to the Judge, one would have to acknowledge that the court in its closing 
comments in relation to the mitigating steps that the owners may take in relation to damages contain 
an implicit recognition of the ‘societal loss’ that has occurred. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the issue of monetary damages in case still outstanding, the 5 Pointz 
example does demonstrate that, while inherent equities will always play a factor in determinations at 
both injunctive relief stage and at trial in actions such as this, the conception of what constitutes a 
work of ‘recognised stature’ may need clarification and subtle re-alignment to reflect the growing 
position of graffiti within both the cannon of visuals arts and in terms of its position as cultural 
property.74 This District Courts decision also highlights that resolution is needed around the issue of 
how transient art indeed may be and yet still qualify for VARA protection. It also in time, depending 
on the damages awarded, may come to demonstrate whether or not the application of VARA does 
provide a practical working deterrent to the destruction of some culturally significant legal graffiti.   
 
                                                      
74 On this latter point see the UK example of Banksy and Haringey Council; Ben Quinn, ‘Haringey council: 
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